Bandwidth exchange: An energy conserving incentive mechanism for cooperation

Dan Zhang, Ryoichi Shinkuma, Narayan Mandayam

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

55 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Cooperative forwarding in wireless networks has shown to yield rate and diversity gains, but it incurs energy costs borne by the cooperating nodes. In this paper we consider an incentive mechanism called Bandwidth Exchange (BE) where the nodes flexibly exchange the transmission bandwidth as a means of providing incentive for forwarding data, without increasing either the total bandwidth required or the total transmit power. The advent of cognitive radios and multicarrier systems such as Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access (OFDMA) with the ability to flexibly delegate and employ a number of subcarriers makes this approach particularly appealing compared to other incentive mechanisms that are often based on abstract notions of credit and shared understanding of worth.We consider a N-node wireless network over a fading channel and use a Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS) mechanism to study the benefits of BE in terms of rate and coverage gains.We also propose two heuristic algorithms based on simple probabilistic rules for forwarding and study the tradeoffs in terms of performance among these approaches. Our results reveal that bandwidth exchange based forwarding can provide transmit power savings in OFDMA networks of at least 3dB compared to noncooperation.

Original languageEnglish
Article number5475349
Pages (from-to)2055-2065
Number of pages11
JournalIEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
Volume9
Issue number6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2010 Jun
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • Bandwidth
  • Cognitive radio
  • Exchange
  • Incentive mechanism
  • Nash bargaining
  • OFDMA

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science Applications
  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering
  • Applied Mathematics

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