Complexity and Efficiency of Nash Equilibria in Noncooperative Simple Platoon Games

Adrianto Ravi Ibrahim, Ahmet Cetinkaya, Masako Kishida

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We investigate the problem of platoon matching through the lens of complexity and efficiency. Specifically, we consider a noncooperative game among a number of vehicles that decide to form or not to form a platoon on a single road. To characterize the computational complexity of calculating the Nash equilibria in this game, we obtain a general upper bound for the length of any best response sequence. Then, we completely characterize the Nash equilibrium when the vehicles are interchangeable. Regarding the efficiency, we show that platooning games can be very inefficient in the worst case, as they can always have zero price of anarchy even when the vehicles have the same cost function.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publication2022 IEEE 61st Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2022
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages4449-4454
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9781665467612
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2022
Event61st IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2022 - Cancun, Mexico
Duration: 2022 Dec 62022 Dec 9

Publication series

NameProceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
Volume2022-December
ISSN (Print)0743-1546
ISSN (Electronic)2576-2370

Conference

Conference61st IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2022
Country/TerritoryMexico
CityCancun
Period22/12/622/12/9

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Modelling and Simulation
  • Control and Optimization

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