Effect of voluntary participation on an alternating and a simultaneous prisoner's dilemma

H. Yamamoto, I. Okada, T. Taguchi, M. Muto

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We studied the evolution of cooperation in the framework of evolutionary game theory, implementing voluntary participation in the prisoner's dilemma. Although previous studies have tried to overcome the dilemma by introducing voluntary participation called a "loner," the question of which strategies among various strategies including voluntary participation are adaptive under competitive circumstances is still an unsolved puzzle. Here we have developed a model that consists of all possible strategies using a one-period memory of past actions. This model enables us to analyze a "melting pot" of strategies, wherein several strategies interact and compete with each other. Our results revealed that one strategy, in which one escapes if a partner defects or cooperates if a partner becomes a loner, dominates and maintains cooperation in an alternating prisoner's dilemma game. However, the so-called "win-stay, lose-shift" strategy dominates in a simultaneous prisoner's dilemma game. Our simulations clearly show that voluntary participation in the prisoner's dilemma game works in the alternating situation rather than the simultaneous one.

Original languageEnglish
Article number032304
JournalPhysical Review E
Volume100
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2019 Sep 11

Fingerprint

games
game theory
guy wires
escape
shift
defects

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistical and Nonlinear Physics
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Condensed Matter Physics

Cite this

Effect of voluntary participation on an alternating and a simultaneous prisoner's dilemma. / Yamamoto, H.; Okada, I.; Taguchi, T.; Muto, M.

In: Physical Review E, Vol. 100, No. 3, 032304, 11.09.2019.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

@article{fdc1b958587e438492f73669df774dea,
title = "Effect of voluntary participation on an alternating and a simultaneous prisoner's dilemma",
abstract = "We studied the evolution of cooperation in the framework of evolutionary game theory, implementing voluntary participation in the prisoner's dilemma. Although previous studies have tried to overcome the dilemma by introducing voluntary participation called a {"}loner,{"} the question of which strategies among various strategies including voluntary participation are adaptive under competitive circumstances is still an unsolved puzzle. Here we have developed a model that consists of all possible strategies using a one-period memory of past actions. This model enables us to analyze a {"}melting pot{"} of strategies, wherein several strategies interact and compete with each other. Our results revealed that one strategy, in which one escapes if a partner defects or cooperates if a partner becomes a loner, dominates and maintains cooperation in an alternating prisoner's dilemma game. However, the so-called {"}win-stay, lose-shift{"} strategy dominates in a simultaneous prisoner's dilemma game. Our simulations clearly show that voluntary participation in the prisoner's dilemma game works in the alternating situation rather than the simultaneous one.",
author = "H. Yamamoto and I. Okada and T. Taguchi and M. Muto",
year = "2019",
month = "9",
day = "11",
doi = "10.1103/PhysRevE.100.032304",
language = "English",
volume = "100",
journal = "Physical review. E",
issn = "1539-3755",
publisher = "American Physical Society",
number = "3",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Effect of voluntary participation on an alternating and a simultaneous prisoner's dilemma

AU - Yamamoto, H.

AU - Okada, I.

AU - Taguchi, T.

AU - Muto, M.

PY - 2019/9/11

Y1 - 2019/9/11

N2 - We studied the evolution of cooperation in the framework of evolutionary game theory, implementing voluntary participation in the prisoner's dilemma. Although previous studies have tried to overcome the dilemma by introducing voluntary participation called a "loner," the question of which strategies among various strategies including voluntary participation are adaptive under competitive circumstances is still an unsolved puzzle. Here we have developed a model that consists of all possible strategies using a one-period memory of past actions. This model enables us to analyze a "melting pot" of strategies, wherein several strategies interact and compete with each other. Our results revealed that one strategy, in which one escapes if a partner defects or cooperates if a partner becomes a loner, dominates and maintains cooperation in an alternating prisoner's dilemma game. However, the so-called "win-stay, lose-shift" strategy dominates in a simultaneous prisoner's dilemma game. Our simulations clearly show that voluntary participation in the prisoner's dilemma game works in the alternating situation rather than the simultaneous one.

AB - We studied the evolution of cooperation in the framework of evolutionary game theory, implementing voluntary participation in the prisoner's dilemma. Although previous studies have tried to overcome the dilemma by introducing voluntary participation called a "loner," the question of which strategies among various strategies including voluntary participation are adaptive under competitive circumstances is still an unsolved puzzle. Here we have developed a model that consists of all possible strategies using a one-period memory of past actions. This model enables us to analyze a "melting pot" of strategies, wherein several strategies interact and compete with each other. Our results revealed that one strategy, in which one escapes if a partner defects or cooperates if a partner becomes a loner, dominates and maintains cooperation in an alternating prisoner's dilemma game. However, the so-called "win-stay, lose-shift" strategy dominates in a simultaneous prisoner's dilemma game. Our simulations clearly show that voluntary participation in the prisoner's dilemma game works in the alternating situation rather than the simultaneous one.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85072677921&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85072677921&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1103/PhysRevE.100.032304

DO - 10.1103/PhysRevE.100.032304

M3 - Article

C2 - 31639975

AN - SCOPUS:85072677921

VL - 100

JO - Physical review. E

JF - Physical review. E

SN - 1539-3755

IS - 3

M1 - 032304

ER -