Efficient node forwarding strategies via non-cooperative game for wireless ad hoc networks

Mingmei Li, Eiji Kamioka, Shigeki Yamada, Yang Cui

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

In multi-hop ad hoc networks, communications rely heavily on cooperation of each node. Albeit a good teamwork will run the wireless networks well, some selfish behaviors could definitely break them down. This paper examines the theoretical aspect of selfish nodes through a non-cooperative game framework. Depending on the tradeoff between the nodes packet generating requirements and forwarding preferences, we introduce a unique "cost and compensation" scheme: the nodes first select their initial packet generating rates, in order to attain their desired values, they adjust the rates according to the associated cost reflected by network status; and they are also compensated once they forward packets for other nodes. We then propose a distributed algorithm to achieve optimal point for individual node-Nash Equilibrium(NE). Finally, simulation results show that proposed scheme is effective to enforce the potentially selfish nodes to co-operate.

Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationLecture Notes in Computer Science
EditorsX. Lu, W. Zhao
Pages334-343
Number of pages10
Volume3619
Publication statusPublished - 2005
Externally publishedYes
EventThird International Conference on Computer Network and Mobile Computing, ICCNMC 2005 - Zhangjiajie, China
Duration: 2005 Aug 22005 Aug 4

Other

OtherThird International Conference on Computer Network and Mobile Computing, ICCNMC 2005
CountryChina
CityZhangjiajie
Period05/8/205/8/4

Fingerprint

Wireless ad hoc networks
Ad hoc networks
Parallel algorithms
Costs
Wireless networks
Communication
Compensation and Redress

Keywords

  • Ad Hoc Networks
  • Nash Equilibrium(NE)
  • Non-cooperative Game

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science (miscellaneous)

Cite this

Li, M., Kamioka, E., Yamada, S., & Cui, Y. (2005). Efficient node forwarding strategies via non-cooperative game for wireless ad hoc networks. In X. Lu, & W. Zhao (Eds.), Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Vol. 3619, pp. 334-343)

Efficient node forwarding strategies via non-cooperative game for wireless ad hoc networks. / Li, Mingmei; Kamioka, Eiji; Yamada, Shigeki; Cui, Yang.

Lecture Notes in Computer Science. ed. / X. Lu; W. Zhao. Vol. 3619 2005. p. 334-343.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Li, M, Kamioka, E, Yamada, S & Cui, Y 2005, Efficient node forwarding strategies via non-cooperative game for wireless ad hoc networks. in X Lu & W Zhao (eds), Lecture Notes in Computer Science. vol. 3619, pp. 334-343, Third International Conference on Computer Network and Mobile Computing, ICCNMC 2005, Zhangjiajie, China, 05/8/2.
Li M, Kamioka E, Yamada S, Cui Y. Efficient node forwarding strategies via non-cooperative game for wireless ad hoc networks. In Lu X, Zhao W, editors, Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Vol. 3619. 2005. p. 334-343
Li, Mingmei ; Kamioka, Eiji ; Yamada, Shigeki ; Cui, Yang. / Efficient node forwarding strategies via non-cooperative game for wireless ad hoc networks. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. editor / X. Lu ; W. Zhao. Vol. 3619 2005. pp. 334-343
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