TY - JOUR
T1 - On Philosophical Concepts of Memory
AU - Sakuragi, Shin
N1 - Funding Information:
* This paper was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 19K00042. An earlier version of this paper was presented at CCPEA 2018. I am indebted to Steven James, one of the editors of this volume, and anonymous referees for numerous helpful comments. 1 S. Bernecker, Memory: A Philosophical Study, Oxford 2010, p. 13. 2 M. Werning and S. Cheng, Taxonomy and Unity of Memory. The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Memory, ed. S. Bernecker and K. Michaelian, New York 2017, pp. 7-20. 3 S. Bernecker, Memory: A Philosophical Study, cit. p. 16.
Publisher Copyright:
© Lo Sguardo-rivista di filosofia.
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - “Remember” is one of the most frequently used English verbs to express our mnemonic phenomena. In the traditional taxonomy of memory in philosophy, called the tripartite concepts, two concepts of declarative memory – propositional and experiential memories – are distinguished. Recently, the traditional classification has been drawing criticism. Markus Werning and Sen Cheng reject the classification because it is based upon English grammar. Sven Bernecker argues that the distinction between the two concepts is «not sharp». In this paper, I defend the two philosophical concepts of memory. The argument in this paper is twofold. Despite Werning and Cheng’s observation, I argue that the two memory concepts are not characterized by English grammar. Against Bernecker, I also defend the alleged ambiguity between the two memory concepts. In my view, the two types of memories appear to be «not sharp» not due to conceptual ambiguity, but rather different ways of memory attribution.
AB - “Remember” is one of the most frequently used English verbs to express our mnemonic phenomena. In the traditional taxonomy of memory in philosophy, called the tripartite concepts, two concepts of declarative memory – propositional and experiential memories – are distinguished. Recently, the traditional classification has been drawing criticism. Markus Werning and Sen Cheng reject the classification because it is based upon English grammar. Sven Bernecker argues that the distinction between the two concepts is «not sharp». In this paper, I defend the two philosophical concepts of memory. The argument in this paper is twofold. Despite Werning and Cheng’s observation, I argue that the two memory concepts are not characterized by English grammar. Against Bernecker, I also defend the alleged ambiguity between the two memory concepts. In my view, the two types of memories appear to be «not sharp» not due to conceptual ambiguity, but rather different ways of memory attribution.
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U2 - 10.5281/zenodo.3721911
DO - 10.5281/zenodo.3721911
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85147515706
SN - 2036-6558
VL - 1
SP - 285
EP - 299
JO - Sguardo
JF - Sguardo
IS - 28
ER -