Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to show that slightly altruistic individuals can build up the cooperative group. We suppose that the sot of agents having various altruistic dispositions are randomly matching and on each matching the agents play the two person's Prisoner's Dilemma game. According to the analysis of this paper, it is clarified that if the conditions that (1) the incentive of deviation from "mutual Cooperation" is small, (2) agents are similar in altruistic disposition, and (3) the initial value of Cooperation rate is high, are satisfied, the system leads to be stable state where the agents taking Cooperation are in majority.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 89-104 |
| Number of pages | 16 |
| Journal | Sociological Theory and Methods |
| Volume | 17 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Publication status | Published - 2002 |
| Externally published | Yes |
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Keywords
- Altruistic parameter
- Best-reply dynamic
- Payoff and utility
- Prisoner's dilemma
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
- Sociology and Political Science
Cite this
Realizing cooperation through slightly altruistic individuals : An evolutionary game theoretical approach. / Muto, Masayoshi.
In: Sociological Theory and Methods, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2002, p. 89-104.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Realizing cooperation through slightly altruistic individuals
T2 - An evolutionary game theoretical approach
AU - Muto, Masayoshi
PY - 2002
Y1 - 2002
N2 - The purpose of this paper is to show that slightly altruistic individuals can build up the cooperative group. We suppose that the sot of agents having various altruistic dispositions are randomly matching and on each matching the agents play the two person's Prisoner's Dilemma game. According to the analysis of this paper, it is clarified that if the conditions that (1) the incentive of deviation from "mutual Cooperation" is small, (2) agents are similar in altruistic disposition, and (3) the initial value of Cooperation rate is high, are satisfied, the system leads to be stable state where the agents taking Cooperation are in majority.
AB - The purpose of this paper is to show that slightly altruistic individuals can build up the cooperative group. We suppose that the sot of agents having various altruistic dispositions are randomly matching and on each matching the agents play the two person's Prisoner's Dilemma game. According to the analysis of this paper, it is clarified that if the conditions that (1) the incentive of deviation from "mutual Cooperation" is small, (2) agents are similar in altruistic disposition, and (3) the initial value of Cooperation rate is high, are satisfied, the system leads to be stable state where the agents taking Cooperation are in majority.
KW - Altruistic parameter
KW - Best-reply dynamic
KW - Payoff and utility
KW - Prisoner's dilemma
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0036380967&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0036380967&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0036380967
VL - 17
SP - 89
EP - 104
JO - Sociological Theory and Methods
JF - Sociological Theory and Methods
SN - 0913-1442
IS - 1
ER -