Realizing cooperation through slightly altruistic individuals: An evolutionary game theoretical approach

Masayoshi Muto

Realizing cooperation through slightly altruistic individuals: An evolutionary game theoretical approach

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to show that slightly altruistic individuals can build up the cooperative group. We suppose that the sot of agents having various altruistic dispositions are randomly matching and on each matching the agents play the two person's Prisoner's Dilemma game. According to the analysis of this paper, it is clarified that if the conditions that (1) the incentive of deviation from "mutual Cooperation" is small, (2) agents are similar in altruistic disposition, and (3) the initial value of Cooperation rate is high, are satisfied, the system leads to be stable state where the agents taking Cooperation are in majority.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	89-104
Number of pages	16
Journal	Sociological Theory and Methods
Volume	17
Issue number	1
Publication status	Published - 2002 Jan 1
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Altruistic parameter
Best-reply dynamic
Payoff and utility
Prisoner's dilemma

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Sociology and Political Science

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Muto, M. (2002). Realizing cooperation through slightly altruistic individuals: An evolutionary game theoretical approach. Sociological Theory and Methods, 17(1), 89-104.

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