Realizing cooperation through slightly altruistic individuals

An evolutionary game theoretical approach

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to show that slightly altruistic individuals can build up the cooperative group. We suppose that the sot of agents having various altruistic dispositions are randomly matching and on each matching the agents play the two person's Prisoner's Dilemma game. According to the analysis of this paper, it is clarified that if the conditions that (1) the incentive of deviation from "mutual Cooperation" is small, (2) agents are similar in altruistic disposition, and (3) the initial value of Cooperation rate is high, are satisfied, the system leads to be stable state where the agents taking Cooperation are in majority.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)89-104
Number of pages16
JournalSociological Theory and Methods
Volume17
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 2002
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

disposition
prisoner
incentive
human being
Values
Group

Keywords

  • Altruistic parameter
  • Best-reply dynamic
  • Payoff and utility
  • Prisoner's dilemma

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Sociology and Political Science

Cite this

@article{766e2ae17dae4ba58c7fe3cd00ef1b54,
title = "Realizing cooperation through slightly altruistic individuals: An evolutionary game theoretical approach",
abstract = "The purpose of this paper is to show that slightly altruistic individuals can build up the cooperative group. We suppose that the sot of agents having various altruistic dispositions are randomly matching and on each matching the agents play the two person's Prisoner's Dilemma game. According to the analysis of this paper, it is clarified that if the conditions that (1) the incentive of deviation from {"}mutual Cooperation{"} is small, (2) agents are similar in altruistic disposition, and (3) the initial value of Cooperation rate is high, are satisfied, the system leads to be stable state where the agents taking Cooperation are in majority.",
keywords = "Altruistic parameter, Best-reply dynamic, Payoff and utility, Prisoner's dilemma",
author = "Masayoshi Muto",
year = "2002",
language = "English",
volume = "17",
pages = "89--104",
journal = "Sociological Theory and Methods",
issn = "0913-1442",
publisher = "Japanese Association for Mathematical Sociology",
number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Realizing cooperation through slightly altruistic individuals

T2 - An evolutionary game theoretical approach

AU - Muto, Masayoshi

PY - 2002

Y1 - 2002

N2 - The purpose of this paper is to show that slightly altruistic individuals can build up the cooperative group. We suppose that the sot of agents having various altruistic dispositions are randomly matching and on each matching the agents play the two person's Prisoner's Dilemma game. According to the analysis of this paper, it is clarified that if the conditions that (1) the incentive of deviation from "mutual Cooperation" is small, (2) agents are similar in altruistic disposition, and (3) the initial value of Cooperation rate is high, are satisfied, the system leads to be stable state where the agents taking Cooperation are in majority.

AB - The purpose of this paper is to show that slightly altruistic individuals can build up the cooperative group. We suppose that the sot of agents having various altruistic dispositions are randomly matching and on each matching the agents play the two person's Prisoner's Dilemma game. According to the analysis of this paper, it is clarified that if the conditions that (1) the incentive of deviation from "mutual Cooperation" is small, (2) agents are similar in altruistic disposition, and (3) the initial value of Cooperation rate is high, are satisfied, the system leads to be stable state where the agents taking Cooperation are in majority.

KW - Altruistic parameter

KW - Best-reply dynamic

KW - Payoff and utility

KW - Prisoner's dilemma

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0036380967&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0036380967&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Article

VL - 17

SP - 89

EP - 104

JO - Sociological Theory and Methods

JF - Sociological Theory and Methods

SN - 0913-1442

IS - 1

ER -