Tolerant indirect reciprocity can boost social welfare through solidarity with unconditional cooperators in private monitoring

Isamu Okada, Tatsuya Sasaki, Yutaka Nakai

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Indirect reciprocity is an important mechanism for resolving social dilemmas. Previous studies explore several types of assessment rules that are evolutionarily stable for keeping cooperation regimes. However, little is known about the effects of private information on social systems. Most indirect reciprocity studies assume public monitoring in which individuals share a single assessment for each individual. Here, we consider a private monitoring system that loosens such an unnatural assumption. We explore the stable norms in the private system using an individual-based simulation. We have three main findings. First, narrow and unstable cooperation: cooperation in private monitoring becomes unstable and the restricted norms cannot maintain cooperative regimes while they can in public monitoring. Second, stable coexistence of discriminators and unconditional cooperators: under private monitoring, unconditional cooperation can play a role in keeping a high level of cooperation in tolerant norm situations. Finally, Pareto improvement: private monitoring can achieve a higher cooperation rate than does public monitoring.

Original languageEnglish
Article number9737
JournalScientific Reports
Volume7
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2017 Dec 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General

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