Can agents acquire human-like behaviors in a sequential bargaining game? - Comparison of roth's and Q-learning agents

Keiki Takadama, Tetsuro Kawai, Yuhsuke Koyama

研究成果: Conference contribution

4 引用 (Scopus)

抜粋

This paper addresses agent modeling in multiagent-based simulation (MABS) to explore agents who can reproduce human-like behaviors in the sequential bargaining game, which is more difficult to be reproduced than in the ultimate game (i.e., one time bargaining game). For this purpose, we focus on the Roth's learning agents who can reproduce human-like behaviors in several simple examples including the ultimate game, and compare simulation results of Roth's learning agents and Q-learning agents in the sequential bargaining game. Intensive simulations have revealed the following implications: (1) Roth's basic and three parameter reinforcement learning agents with any type of three action selections (i.e., e-greed, roulette, and Boltzmann distribution selections) can neither learn consistent behaviors nor acquire sequential negotiation in sequential bargaining game; and (2) Q-learning agents with any type of three action selections, on the other hand, can learn consistent behaviors and acquire sequential negotiation in the same game. However, Q-learning agents cannot reproduce the decreasing trend found in subject experiments.

元の言語English
ホスト出版物のタイトルMulti-Agent-Based Simulation VII - International Workshop, MABS 2006, Revised and Invited Papers
ページ156-171
ページ数16
出版物ステータスPublished - 2007 12 28
イベント7th International Workshop on Multi-Agent-Based Simulation, MABS 2006 - Hakodate, Japan
継続期間: 2007 5 82007 5 8

出版物シリーズ

名前Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
4442 LNAI
ISSN(印刷物)0302-9743
ISSN(電子版)1611-3349

Other

Other7th International Workshop on Multi-Agent-Based Simulation, MABS 2006
Japan
Hakodate
期間07/5/807/5/8

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • Computer Science(all)

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  • これを引用

    Takadama, K., Kawai, T., & Koyama, Y. (2007). Can agents acquire human-like behaviors in a sequential bargaining game? - Comparison of roth's and Q-learning agents. : Multi-Agent-Based Simulation VII - International Workshop, MABS 2006, Revised and Invited Papers (pp. 156-171). (Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics); 巻数 4442 LNAI).