In multi-hop ad hoc networks, communications rely heavily on cooperation of each node. Albeit a good teamwork will run the wireless networks well, some selfish behaviors could definitely break them down. This paper examines the theoretical aspect of selfish nodes through a non-cooperative game framework. Depending on the tradeoff between the nodes packet generating requirements and forwarding preferences, we introduce a unique "cost and compensation" scheme: the nodes first select their initial packet generating rates, in order to attain their desired values, they adjust the rates according to the associated cost reflected by network status; and they are also compensated once they forward packets for other nodes. We then propose a distributed algorithm to achieve optimal point for individual node-Nash Equilibrium(NE). Finally, simulation results show that proposed scheme is effective to enforce the potentially selfish nodes to co-operate.
|ジャーナル||Lecture Notes in Computer Science|
|出版ステータス||Published - 2005|
|イベント||Third International Conference on Computer Network and Mobile Computing, ICCNMC 2005 - Zhangjiajie, China|
継続期間: 2005 8月 2 → 2005 8月 4
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- コンピュータ サイエンス（全般）