Efficient node forwarding strategies via non-cooperative game for wireless ad hoc networks

Mingmei Li, Eiji Kamioka, Shigeki Yamada, Yang Cui

研究成果: Conference contribution

抄録

In multi-hop ad hoc networks, communications rely heavily on cooperation of each node. Albeit a good teamwork will run the wireless networks well, some selfish behaviors could definitely break them down. This paper examines the theoretical aspect of selfish nodes through a non-cooperative game framework. Depending on the tradeoff between the nodes packet generating requirements and forwarding preferences, we introduce a unique "cost and compensation" scheme: the nodes first select their initial packet generating rates, in order to attain their desired values, they adjust the rates according to the associated cost reflected by network status; and they are also compensated once they forward packets for other nodes. We then propose a distributed algorithm to achieve optimal point for individual node-Nash Equilibrium(NE). Finally, simulation results show that proposed scheme is effective to enforce the potentially selfish nodes to co-operate.

元の言語English
ホスト出版物のタイトルLecture Notes in Computer Science
編集者X. Lu, W. Zhao
ページ334-343
ページ数10
3619
出版物ステータスPublished - 2005
外部発表Yes
イベントThird International Conference on Computer Network and Mobile Computing, ICCNMC 2005 - Zhangjiajie, China
継続期間: 2005 8 22005 8 4

Other

OtherThird International Conference on Computer Network and Mobile Computing, ICCNMC 2005
China
Zhangjiajie
期間05/8/205/8/4

Fingerprint

Wireless ad hoc networks
Ad hoc networks
Parallel algorithms
Costs
Wireless networks
Communication
Compensation and Redress

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science (miscellaneous)

これを引用

Li, M., Kamioka, E., Yamada, S., & Cui, Y. (2005). Efficient node forwarding strategies via non-cooperative game for wireless ad hoc networks. : X. Lu, & W. Zhao (版), Lecture Notes in Computer Science (巻 3619, pp. 334-343)

Efficient node forwarding strategies via non-cooperative game for wireless ad hoc networks. / Li, Mingmei; Kamioka, Eiji; Yamada, Shigeki; Cui, Yang.

Lecture Notes in Computer Science. 版 / X. Lu; W. Zhao. 巻 3619 2005. p. 334-343.

研究成果: Conference contribution

Li, M, Kamioka, E, Yamada, S & Cui, Y 2005, Efficient node forwarding strategies via non-cooperative game for wireless ad hoc networks. : X Lu & W Zhao (版), Lecture Notes in Computer Science. 巻. 3619, pp. 334-343, Third International Conference on Computer Network and Mobile Computing, ICCNMC 2005, Zhangjiajie, China, 05/8/2.
Li M, Kamioka E, Yamada S, Cui Y. Efficient node forwarding strategies via non-cooperative game for wireless ad hoc networks. : Lu X, Zhao W, 編集者, Lecture Notes in Computer Science. 巻 3619. 2005. p. 334-343
Li, Mingmei ; Kamioka, Eiji ; Yamada, Shigeki ; Cui, Yang. / Efficient node forwarding strategies via non-cooperative game for wireless ad hoc networks. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. 編集者 / X. Lu ; W. Zhao. 巻 3619 2005. pp. 334-343
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