抄録
In multi-hop ad hoc networks, communications rely heavily on cooperation of each node. Albeit a good teamwork will run the wireless networks well, some selfish behaviors could definitely break them down. This paper examines the theoretical aspect of selfish nodes through a non-cooperative game framework. Depending on the tradeoff between the nodes packet generating requirements and forwarding preferences, we introduce a unique "cost and compensation" scheme: the nodes first select their initial packet generating rates, in order to attain their desired values, they adjust the rates according to the associated cost reflected by network status; and they are also compensated once they forward packets for other nodes. We then propose a distributed algorithm to achieve optimal point for individual node-Nash Equilibrium(NE). Finally, simulation results show that proposed scheme is effective to enforce the potentially selfish nodes to co-operate.
| 元の言語 | English |
|---|---|
| ホスト出版物のタイトル | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
| 編集者 | X. Lu, W. Zhao |
| ページ | 334-343 |
| ページ数 | 10 |
| 巻 | 3619 |
| 出版物ステータス | Published - 2005 |
| 外部発表 | Yes |
| イベント | Third International Conference on Computer Network and Mobile Computing, ICCNMC 2005 - Zhangjiajie, China 継続期間: 2005 8 2 → 2005 8 4 |
Other
| Other | Third International Conference on Computer Network and Mobile Computing, ICCNMC 2005 |
|---|---|
| 国 | China |
| 市 | Zhangjiajie |
| 期間 | 05/8/2 → 05/8/4 |
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ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Computer Science (miscellaneous)
これを引用
Efficient node forwarding strategies via non-cooperative game for wireless ad hoc networks. / Li, Mingmei; Kamioka, Eiji; Yamada, Shigeki; Cui, Yang.
Lecture Notes in Computer Science. 版 / X. Lu; W. Zhao. 巻 3619 2005. p. 334-343.研究成果: Conference contribution
}
TY - GEN
T1 - Efficient node forwarding strategies via non-cooperative game for wireless ad hoc networks
AU - Li, Mingmei
AU - Kamioka, Eiji
AU - Yamada, Shigeki
AU - Cui, Yang
PY - 2005
Y1 - 2005
N2 - In multi-hop ad hoc networks, communications rely heavily on cooperation of each node. Albeit a good teamwork will run the wireless networks well, some selfish behaviors could definitely break them down. This paper examines the theoretical aspect of selfish nodes through a non-cooperative game framework. Depending on the tradeoff between the nodes packet generating requirements and forwarding preferences, we introduce a unique "cost and compensation" scheme: the nodes first select their initial packet generating rates, in order to attain their desired values, they adjust the rates according to the associated cost reflected by network status; and they are also compensated once they forward packets for other nodes. We then propose a distributed algorithm to achieve optimal point for individual node-Nash Equilibrium(NE). Finally, simulation results show that proposed scheme is effective to enforce the potentially selfish nodes to co-operate.
AB - In multi-hop ad hoc networks, communications rely heavily on cooperation of each node. Albeit a good teamwork will run the wireless networks well, some selfish behaviors could definitely break them down. This paper examines the theoretical aspect of selfish nodes through a non-cooperative game framework. Depending on the tradeoff between the nodes packet generating requirements and forwarding preferences, we introduce a unique "cost and compensation" scheme: the nodes first select their initial packet generating rates, in order to attain their desired values, they adjust the rates according to the associated cost reflected by network status; and they are also compensated once they forward packets for other nodes. We then propose a distributed algorithm to achieve optimal point for individual node-Nash Equilibrium(NE). Finally, simulation results show that proposed scheme is effective to enforce the potentially selfish nodes to co-operate.
KW - Ad Hoc Networks
KW - Nash Equilibrium(NE)
KW - Non-cooperative Game
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=26444562383&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=26444562383&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:26444562383
VL - 3619
SP - 334
EP - 343
BT - Lecture Notes in Computer Science
A2 - Lu, X.
A2 - Zhao, W.
ER -