Subgame perfect equilibrium analysis for jamming attacks on resilient graphs

Yurid Nugraha, Tomohisa Hayakawa, Ahmet Cetinkaya, Hideaki Ishii, Quanyan Zhu

研究成果: Conference contribution

10 被引用数 (Scopus)

抄録

A cyber security problem is considered in a networked system formulated as a resilient graph problem based on a game theoretic approach. The connectivity of the underlying graph of the network system is reduced by an attacker who removes some of the edges whereas the defender attempts to recover them. Both players are subject to energy constraints so that their actions are restricted and cannot be performed continuously. We provide a subgame perfect equilibrium analysis and fully characterize the optimal strategies for the attacker and the defender in terms of edge connectivity and the number of connected components of the graph. The resilient graph game is then applied to the multiagent consensus problem. We study how the attacks and the recovery on the edges affect the consensus process.

本文言語English
ホスト出版物のタイトル2019 American Control Conference, ACC 2019
出版社Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
ページ2060-2065
ページ数6
ISBN(電子版)9781538679265
DOI
出版ステータスPublished - 2019 7月
外部発表はい
イベント2019 American Control Conference, ACC 2019 - Philadelphia, United States
継続期間: 2019 7月 102019 7月 12

出版物シリーズ

名前Proceedings of the American Control Conference
2019-July
ISSN(印刷版)0743-1619

Conference

Conference2019 American Control Conference, ACC 2019
国/地域United States
CityPhiladelphia
Period19/7/1019/7/12

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • 電子工学および電気工学

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