Tolerant indirect reciprocity can boost social welfare through solidarity with unconditional cooperators in private monitoring

Isamu Okada, Tatsuya Sasaki, Yutaka Nakai

研究成果: Article

6 引用 (Scopus)

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Indirect reciprocity is an important mechanism for resolving social dilemmas. Previous studies explore several types of assessment rules that are evolutionarily stable for keeping cooperation regimes. However, little is known about the effects of private information on social systems. Most indirect reciprocity studies assume public monitoring in which individuals share a single assessment for each individual. Here, we consider a private monitoring system that loosens such an unnatural assumption. We explore the stable norms in the private system using an individual-based simulation. We have three main findings. First, narrow and unstable cooperation: cooperation in private monitoring becomes unstable and the restricted norms cannot maintain cooperative regimes while they can in public monitoring. Second, stable coexistence of discriminators and unconditional cooperators: under private monitoring, unconditional cooperation can play a role in keeping a high level of cooperation in tolerant norm situations. Finally, Pareto improvement: private monitoring can achieve a higher cooperation rate than does public monitoring.

元の言語English
記事番号9737
ジャーナルScientific Reports
7
発行部数1
DOI
出版物ステータスPublished - 2017 12 1

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • General

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